We analyze individual career transitions of men and women in Germany. Our particular focus is on the association of upward, downward and horizontal job changes with individual fertility. In contrast to most of the literature, we focus on potential rather than realized fertility. Based on mixed multivariate proportional hazard models with competing risks, we find a significant negative relationship between the contemporaneous probability of having a child and horizontal career transitions for women and a positive significant association of the hazard of parenthood with upward career transitions for men. These effects persist when we apply fixed-effects panel data models allowing for correlation of individual parenthood hazards with unobserved individual characteristics. Our results suggest clear gender differences in the relationship between career patterns and potential fertility.
Introduction
Gender differences in the labor market remain a hot topic in labor economics. Women generally earn less than men, their wage mobility is lower and they are underrepresented in top management positions (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005 , Manning and Swaffield 2008 , Baerts, Deschacht, and Guerry 2011 , Blau and Kahn 2007 , Kunze 2017 . Some studies have found the existence of a "glass ceiling" to women's career perspectives which excludes them from high-earnings and high-status positions (Albrecht, Bjrklund, and Vroman 2003, Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan 2007) . Career progression is linked to wage growth, status and job satisfaction. Understanding the differences in career transition patterns between men and women is a starting point for identifying the factors that hamper women's career progression, and may help to explain the gender gap at the upper end of the career ladder. Fertility-related aspects have been considered to be a potential main driver of gender differences in the career course. A number of studies have established a relationship between career interruptions due to child rearing and slower wage growth or even wage losses (Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2002 , Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010 . Lalive and Zweimüller 2009 Fitzenberger, Sommerfeld, and Steffes 2013 and Drange and Rege 2013) .
While realized fertility is certainly a major candidate for explaining the differences between men and women after the birth of a child, the effect of potential fertility on career transitions has received less attention. Different mechanisms may give rise to an effect of potential fertility on career transitions. The most obvious one is that employers could shy away from hiring or promoting women who have a high hazard of becoming a mother in the near future because they fear that these women might become unavailable for work because of child birth or that their productivity after child birth could suffer due to parenting duties (Lazear and Rosen 1990) . Such a mechanism follows the theory of statistical discrimination, i.e. employers might discriminate against women with a high observable pregnancy hazard, no matter whether a given woman will actually give birth to a child or not. There may also be supply-side effects of a high pregnancy hazard on career transitions, i.e. at a time at which a woman considers the possibility to become a mother to be high, she may choose not to make certain career transitions. Effects of potential fertility on career transitions may also exist for men. Employers might interpret indicators of a high hazard of imminent parenthood (e.g. marital status) as a positive signal indicating high productivity and career commitment, or such men might voluntarily make or not make certain career transitions.
The aim of this paper is to directly investigate the relationship between the hazard of becoming a parent and the propensity for directional career movements, i.e. upward, downward and horizontal career transitions. To our best knowledge, this has not been done in this form in the literature before. We measure the career level of a person in terms of the number of subordinates directly supervised and, alternatively, by a standard occupational prestige score (in our case, the Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale, SIOPS). We focus on career transitions of men and women before the birth of a first child in order to separate, as completely as possible, the aspect of potential fertility from that of realized fertility. The more general research question of our study is the comparative analysis of directional career transitions for men and women. We pursue this research question in the framework of simultaneous hazards (Lillard 1993) , i.e. the hazards of directional career movements are modeled jointly with the individual hazard of becoming a parent, whereby the parenthood hazard directly enters the hazards of directional career movements as an explanatory variable. We also take account of a large number of other potential determinants of career transitions as well as of aspects such as state dependence, duration dependence and lagged duration dependence. This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review some related literature. Section 3 discusses institutional details and incentives. Section 4 describes our data. In Section 5, we outline our econometric framework. Section 6 presents our empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
There is a large literature on career development of men and women. Some studies focus on promotion, some on wage growth, while others analyze job mobility covering job-to-job movements irrespective of the rank. Summarizing results on promotions is difficult, because the term promotion covers a range of different processes depending on the data used (see Gibbons and Waldman 1999 for a theoretical overview of the term promotion and Abele, Spurk, and Volmer 2011, on career success). Many studies using survey data rely on self-reported promotions (e.g. Booth, Francesconi, and Frank 2003, Blau and DeVaro 2007) , and others use employer-provided or administrative information (e.g. Pekkarinen and Vartiainen 2006) . If promotion is measured as a change in job prestige covering a job-to-job change, one needs data that have comparable scales about the hierarchical level or the job task description (see Granqvist and Persson 2005 , Pekkarinen and Vartiainen 2006 , Kunze 2013 ).
An important distinction is the one between internal and external promotions (Acosta 2010) . Internal promotions happen within the employment spell at the same employer, while external promotions refer to promotions in connection with job changes. Due to data restrictions, in this paper, we will only study job-to-job movements (for more details, see below). Each transition is defined as either an upward, a downward or a horizontal movement. While upward movements can be interpreted as promotions, horizontal transitions come closer to what is labeled as job mobility in the literature. Promotions are often considered to be a main driver of wage growth (e.g. McCue 1996) . However, job mobility is theoretically and empirically also found to be closely connected to wage growth. According to the "job shopping" theory, employees benefit from early job mobility (see e.g. Johnson 1978 , Topel and Ward 1992 , Schmelzer 2012 , Bagger et al. 2014 ). An important implication is that, in the possible case of employer discrimination against women, reduced early job mobility may have more long-term consequences on the likelihood of upward and horizontal transitions.
Theoretically, lower career transition probabilities for women might be due to employers' behavior in processes of promotion and hiring, described by the theory of statistical discrimination (Becker 1957; Phelps 1972) . 1 According to this argument, all women face lower promotion probabilities compared to men because some women will interrupt their employment as a consequence of giving birth to a child. Following Aigner and Cain (1977) , this would not necessarily result in an unwarranted discrimination of women as a group because employers need to take account of the higher separation risk of women in their hiring and promotion decisions, leading to the situation that women who do give birth later are granted a higher-than-warranted promotion probability at the expense of other women who face a promotion probability that is too low given their probability of quitting. However, in a life-cycle perspective, the women who do quit for fertility reasons later will not actually benefit from their earlier "preferential" treatment, so that there may be a net loss for the group of women as a whole. Moreover, for many, the idea that a given individual should be "penalized" for group characteristics or for tasks considered to be essential for the reproduction of society may seem questionable.
The central theoretical contribution in the literature modeling the consequences of higher female separation rates for job promotions is Lazear and Rosen (1990) . In their model, women are assumed to have more out-ofwork possibilities than men and are therefore more likely to quit in their later employment path. Employers take this into account in their hiring and promotion decisions with the consequence that women have to be more able than men to get promoted to the next career stage. As a consequence, the final career rank and compensation is lower for women than for men, even under the assumption of an equal ability distribution for men and women.
The existing empirical literature generally shows that women are underrepresented in top-management and executive positions and have lower unconditional promotion rates (e.g. Cobb-Clark 2001 , Blau and DeVaro 2007 , Smith, Smith, and Verner 2013 , Kunze and Miller 2017 . The picture becomes less clear with respect to conditional promotion probabilities. Groot and Maassen van den Brink (1996) find that women are less frequently in jobs that offer promotion possibilities, but if they are, they do not face lower promotion probabilities. The results in Blau and DeVaro (2007) suggest lower probabilities of promotion for women, but no gender differences in wage growth with or without promotions. Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2003) present a theory and empirical evidence for the "sticky floor" hypothesis. According to their model, women are as likely as men to get promoted, but they end up at the bottom of the pay scale in the new grade. Other representative examples of literature are Hersch and Viscusi (1996) , Cobb-Clark (2001) , Francesconi (2001) and Johnston and Lee (2012) . Results on job mobility confirm the "job shopping" hypothesis and reveal substantial gender differences. Schmelzer (2012) finds positive wage effects of direct job mobility in the early career. According to Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016) , voluntary moves tend to be upward and connected to wage gains.
Focusing on gender differences in more detail, Granqvist and Persson (2005) show that family-related factors, such as being married, have contradictory effects on men's and women's transition probabilities to higher ranked jobs. They also find negative effects of career interruptions due to child birth on women's career mobility. The result that especially variables related to family responsibilities affect men and women in a different way is also confirmed in Kunze (2013) , who finds that the probability of progressing on the career ladder is reduced through children for women but not for men. On the contrary, men with one or two children are most likely to climb the career ladder. Related to these findings, there may also be effects of partnership on career progression. The hypotheses that men benefit from being in a relationship while women's career courses are negatively affected by cohabitation are often referred to as "marriage premium" and "marriage penalty," respectively. The theoretical arguments are based on human capital theory, but empirical evidence is mixed (Verbakel and De Graaf 2008) . Finally, Kunze and Troske (2012) exploit firm closures as a natural experiment in order to investigate gender differences in job search behavior. Their results suggest that gender differences in job search and mobility are related to fertility decisions and are apparent in prime childbearing years.
As indicated above, most of the empirical literature focuses on the effects of realized but not on potential or future fertility on career paths. Exceptions are Francesconi (2002) ) and Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017) , who present theoretical and empirical models of intertemporal career decisions and fertility behavior. These models emphasize forward-looking behavior and the potential long-term relationship between career and fertility choices (they do not consider demand-side mechanisms). Our more modest goal in this paper is to investigate the potential instantaneous link between the probability of becoming a parent and the probabilities for different career movements at given points in time. To our best knowledge, this has not been done in this form in the literature before. One of the few contributions that consider the link between potential fertility and career status is Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1997) who investigate the determinants of the current career rank of men and women and who include as an explanatory variable aggregate fertility indicators for women. Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1997) do not model transitions between ranks or potential fertility effects on men's career outcomes, and they do not explicitly model individual fertility hazards. There are also a small number of experimental studies based on artificial job applications whose implicit research questions resemble the one considered by us. Petit (2007) presents evidence for hiring discrimination against women aged 25 applying for high-skilled administrative jobs but no discrimination of women among single and childless applicants aged 37. Baert (2014) finds evidence for discrimination of young heterosexual women (compared to homosexual women) when applying for job vacancies. Gloor et al. (2015) conduct an experiment among personnel managers in which respondents were asked to rate the amount of risk they perceive in hiring a particular candidate. They find a noticeable relationship between perceived risk during prime childbearing years for women but not for men. Becker, Fernandes, and Weichselbaumer (2016) test whether employers discriminate against fertility-related information in CVs and find some evidence for negative discrimination for full-time jobs and positive discrimination for part-time jobs.
Compared to the cited articles, our goal is to explicitly model the relationship between the empirically measured hazard of becoming a mother or a father and the likelihood for different career movements in a joint way using the simultaneous hazards approach introduced by Lillard (1993) . 2 In view of the literature, our hypothesis is that the probability of upward and horizontal career transitions is negatively related to the parenthood hazard for women, while we conjecture that high contemporaneous parenthood hazards might constitute a positive career signal for men. We further expect (other) family-related variables to differently affect men's and women's career transitions.
Institutional Setting and Incentives
In order to assess the incentives for individuals and employers to deal with fertility-related aspects, we provide a brief overview over relevant regulations (for more details, see Dustmann and Schönberg 2012; Fitzenberger, Sommerfeld, and Steffes 2013) . In general, women enjoy a high level of protection under German law before and after they give birth. From the time a pregnancy becomes known, it is strictly forbidden to dismiss women who are pregnant. It is also forbidden to ask a woman in a job interview whether or not she is pregnant. Women are allowed to lie about a potential pregnancy in job interviews, and employers must not dismiss them even after it becomes known that they lied. The dismissal protection of pregnant women is thus independent of job tenure. Regulations on parental leave are also independent of job tenure. Over the periods considered, women enjoyed substantial maternity leave protection including extended job protection periods after child birth during which the firm was not allowed to dismiss the woman, and after which the woman had the right to return to a job that was comparable to the one she held before (for details, see Dustmann and Schönberg 2012) . In general, the high level of fertility-related protection can be expected to generate strong incentives for employers to avoid hiring women who are or who may become pregnant in the near future. Although, in theory, employers must not base their hiring decisions on fertility aspects, it will be hard in practice to sue employers unless there is hard evidence for discrimination.
This institutional setting and the surrounding labor market environment imply a number of relevant incentives for both employers and employees. The situation is one of asymmetric information in which employers do not have much concrete information on existing or planned fertility events of their employees. The asymmetric information setting is reinforced by the fact that in our data we only observe job-to-job changes and no internal promotions (for which the employer may use more private information). The degree of asymmetric information increases the scope both for employer discrimination and for supply-side behavior. If a women already knows that she is pregnant or plans to become pregnant soon, this may reduce her career ambitions. Maternal protection laws would allow her to apply at employers without disclosing this information. This will strengthen the case for statistical discrimination on the side of employers. If statistical discrimination based on publicly observable information exists, our model will pick it up as we include in our predicted fertility indicator only information that can be observed from "outside" the individual.
Supply-side behavior may be an important part of the effects we identify in our analysis below. If a woman plans to become pregnant, she may hesitate to change her employer in order to avoid increased responsibilities that are difficult to reconcile with planned child-care activities. Another reason for avoiding employer changes before birth is that part-time opportunities are likely to depend on tenure so that the person might not be able to return part-time after child birth at a new employer. This is consistent with evidence showing that lower career orientation in the form of part-time work tends to be related with higher female job satisfaction (Booth and van Ours 2008; Bridges and Owens 2017) . For men, we may also observe potential effects both of statistical discrimination, i.e. employers interpret a high likelihood of fatherhood as a positive productivity signal, and of supply-side behavior. The latter may arise if men who are likely to become fathers soon aim to compensate anticipated income losses and rising family needs because they expect to become the sole breadwinner of a family.
Data
For our analysis, we need data covering personal employment, partnership and fertility information in one dataset. For this purpose, we use the survey "Working and Learning in a Changing World" (ALWA) provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) at the German Federal Employment Agency (see Kleinert et al. 2011) . The ALWA is a representative, retrospective dataset covering life-cycle information of a large number of German men and women, including independent monthly spell information on different life domains such as education, employment, fertility, family formation and regional mobility, among others. The survey design is representative for the German population born between 1956 and 1988. In practice, there are small deviations from representativeness, in particular undersampling of the foreign population and slight oversampling of older individuals . Such deviations are no problem for us, as we condition our analysis on a large number of covariates, i.e. we consider behavior for narrowly defined subgroups for which it is not important whether they are under-or overrepresented (see Wooldridge 2010, ch. 19) . The retrospective nature of the data may be a concern, but the survey was carried out in a computer-assisted way including built-in crosschecks between different life domains in order to eliminate response errors already during the survey phase . Extensive editing after the survey further increased data quality. Note that our analysis would not be possible with administrative data as they typically do not include the kind of comprehensive life-cycle information from different life domains included in the ALWA. In addition to the information contained in the survey, we merged variables on aggregate and regional unemployment, employment and fertility available from the statistical offices to our data set.
In the ALWA dataset, individual employment histories are reported per episode, with a new episode defined by a change of employer, a fundamental change in the task performed or an employment interruption such as unemployment, parental leave or military service. As a preparatory step, we first generated a complete employment history for every individual for which we adjusted parallel spells by defining main and secondary employment resolving cases of overlapping schooling or training spells. In our final dataset, every month from age 15 onwards is uniquely identified as either an employment or a nonemployment spell. In certain cases, e.g. if an employment spell was followed by a short interruptive spell of search unemployment, we extended the first spell to also include the short intermediate spell. We did this in order to avoid an employment spell to be classified as censored, although from a substantive point of view, there was a career transition to a subsequent employment spell. If an employment spell was artificially extended, we controlled for this and the exact reason why it was extended in our hazard model estimates. Employment spells that were followed by nonemployment spells were treated as being censored. Our analysis covers all employment spells in an individual's biography starting with the first employment spell. We have no left-censored spells as we observe the complete biography of each individual.
For every employment episode, we have information on the occupation of a person as well as on individual and establishment characteristics. As a first definition of directional job changes, we classified the career level during a given job spell by the number of subordinates supervised by the person in question. A change in this number by three or more people defines an upward or a downward movement. In the case of no change or a change by no more than two subordinates, an employment transition was classified as a "horizontal" career movement. We experimented with different definitions of upward/downward movements but found this definition to be a good compromise between the substantive concept of an upward/downward transition and the resulting number of transitions. As an alternative indicator of the career level, we used the Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS) which was designed for coding internationally comparable measures of occupational status based on the International Standard Classification of Occupation 1988 (ISCO88). The SIOPS scale, originally developed by Treiman (1977) , ranges from 0 to 100. Its construction is based on results from national surveys on the rating of different occupations in terms of rank (for a detailed description of the coding procedures see Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996) . We define upward and downward transitions as any upward or downward change in the SIOPS score.
Our sample is restricted to the birth cohorts 1956 to 1988 and to individuals living in West Germany or in East Germany after 1990. We only consider individuals (men and women) before they become parents for the first time. We do this in order to exclusively focus on the effects of potential rather than of realized fertility. Moreover, in this way, we avoid difficult problems of sample selection as the group of individuals who continue to work after first birth is likely to be highly selective (especially for women). The definition of our target population also reflects the fact that career environments of men and women are relatively comparable before first birth, while stark differences begin to develop afterward. Our final sample includes 2,883 women and 2,734 men. We observe 2.2 career spells per individual on average. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on the number and duration of employment spells. For the 2,883 (2,734) women (men) in our sample, we observe 5,482 (6,194) job spells. 2,355 (3,041) of those end with a transition to a subsequent job episode that can be characterized as an upward, downward or horizontal transition as measured by a change in the number of subordinates (see top panel of Table 1 ). Censored spells are followed by an episode without employment which could be unemployment, educational spells or other interruptions. Censored spells are on average three times as long as spells ending in an upward or horizontal transition and twice as long as spells leading to a downward transition. This pattern is observed for both women and men. It suggests that individuals who "climb the career ladder" do so very quickly, while those who plan to exit the labor market or to step down on the career ladder remain longer in their current position. The numbers for changes in the SIOPS shown in the lower panel of Table 1 are slightly different due to the different definition of transitions and due to differential missing values. As expected, we generally observe more upward/downward transitions and shorter spell durations when using the more sensitive SIOPS definition (which defines changes as any change in the SIOPS classification). For example, for women, there are 248 downward transitions in terms of a change of the number of subordinates, as opposed to 403 downward transitions in terms of the SIOPS. At first glance, it might be surprising that the SIOPS definition does not produce even more upward/downward movements when compared to the more "robust" definition in terms of the number of subordinates. At closer inspection, it turns out, however, that in many cases in which there was a change in the number of subordinates by more than three, there was no corresponding change in the occupation code (i.e. the SIOPS change was "horizontal"), so that the SIOPS definition does not necessarily imply a higher number of transitions than the definition in terms of changes in the number of subordinates.
In our analysis of fertility risk and directional career changes, we use a large number of covariates listed in Table 2 (summary statistics by gender are provided in Table 7 in the appendix). In particular, we control for personal characteristics such as the age of the person (6 age brackets), educational qualifications (two categories), work experience, marital status, whether the person is religious, whether the person has a partner with high or low education (base category: no partner), whether the person resides in East Germany, whether the person had moved recently (mobility indicator), the sector the person is working in, firm size, and an indicator for part-time work. We also include two (self-reported) ability indicators, one for mathematical abilities and one for verbal abilities. In order to account for various forms of state and duration dependence in career transitions, we consider the duration of the current employment spell (4 categories), the cumulated duration of job spells with/without supervisory responsibilities, the current number of subordinates (5 categories), the number of employment interruptions before the current job spells, the number of jobs held before the current job spells as well as a number of indicators for activities during employment interruptions. Finally, we include aggregate information such as the birthrate by year and federal state, the potential child allowance, the regional unemployment rate and its deviation from the trend, female labor market participation at the federal state as well as quadratic time trends. The exact way in which all of these variables enter our analysis will become more evident below. 1 Included in female sample to account for differences in female labor market behavior between federal states.
Econometric Methods

Mixed Multivariate Proportional Hazard Model
Our goal is to model the pregnancy hazard -or more generally the parenthood hazard 3 -simultaneously with the hazards of making an upward, downward or horizontal career transition. For this purpose, we estimate a multivariate proportional hazard model with competing risks, in which the predicted parenthood hazard enters as an explanatory variable in the hazards for making one of the three career transitions (see Lillard 1993 and Van den Berg 2001).
Our simultaneous model looks as follows:
In this model, ℎ ( | , ) represents the prediction of individual 's hazard of starting parenthood at time based on observables and , where denotes variables that do not appear in the explanatory variables , , ℎ of the hazards for the different career transitions. These hazards are denoted as ℎ ( | , ), ℎ ( | , ), ℎ ℎ ( | ℎ , ) and represent the likelihood of making an upward, downward or horizontal career transition at time given explanatory variables , , ℎ and conditional on unobserved heterogeneity = ( , , ℎ ). In order to be able to detect changes in an individual's pregnancy hazard that can be predicted from "outside" the individual (i.e. by a potential employer), we include in only information that can be inferred from a CV such as age, education, experience, marital status and religion (for details, see Table 2 ). Given the structure of the model, we also include instrumental variables which shift the predicted pregnancy hazard independently of other characteristics of the individual. In our empirical implementation, we include in the birthrate by year and federal state as well as the amount of potential child allowance in a given year. Note that we do not include in eq. (1) an unobserved heterogeneity term as this would represent information not observable from outside the individual. As explanatory variables of upward, downward or horizontal career transitions , , ℎ , we consider a wide range of covariates such as educational and employment history, age, education, experience, partner information, employer characteristics, ability indicators, among others (see previous section and Table 2 for how these variables enter our model). The vector = ( , , ℎ ) denotes individual-specific terms that capture unobserved characteristics , and ℎ influencing certain career movements. Such unobserved heterogeneity may arise if different types of persons with time-constant preferences for career transitions exist, i.e. individuals who are generally more or less mobile, or more upward or downward mobile conditional on observed characteristics .
For the three career hazards, we assume a competing risks structure, i.e. the probability of making a particular career transition at time is computed as the product of the probability of making this transition at and the probability of not making any of the other two career transitions until . The resulting likelihood contribution for month of individual is given by
where , , ℎ and are dummies indicating an upward, downward, horizontal or parenthood transition at the end of month . In order to integrate out the unobserved effect = ( , , ℎ ), we assume a discrete mass point distribution * ( ) with two mass points leading to the likelihood conditional on observed information
Fixed-Effects SUR Model
A limitation of the previous model is that the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the career equations , , ℎ are assumed to be independent of the observed covariates of the model , , , , ℎ . In order to relax this assumption, we also estimate a fixed-effects panel data model in which we jointly model the monthly probabilities of upward, downward and horizontal career transitions along with the monthly probability of starting parenthood. In this model, fixed unobserved determinants of career transitions may follow an arbitrary joint distribution and may be correlated with all other parts of the model including the observables. Moreover, as these fixed unobserved determinants of career transitions will be completely eliminated in the estimation procedure, they may even be correlated with aspects unmodeled in our setup such as time-constant unobserved fertility preferences of the individual.
The resulting model is given by
= +ĥ + + (8)
where ( = , , ℎ) denote person-specific fixed effects for the different career directions and ( = , , , ℎ) are idiosyncratic error terms.
Demeaning the explanatory variables in the career equations leads to the following system of equations which we estimate by efficient NLSUR (e.g. Greene 2012):
The model has the straightforward interpretation that we measure, within individuals' career trajectories, to what extent the probability of making a particular career transition is above or below its individual-specific average at times at which the individual's pregnancy hazard is above or below its individual-specific average. As an important variation, we also consider spell-fixed effects, i.e. ( = , , ℎ) are assumed to be constant within career spells, but may be different across career spells. This allows for some variability in unobserved preferences for career transitions over time. Both the person-fixed effects and the spell-fixed effects models are identified from the fact that we have independent monthly information on fertility events and career transitions along with time-varying monthly information on a wide range of other characteristics. This is due to the fact that our data base features independent monthly spell information from all the relevant life domains such as education, employment, fertility, partnership formation and residential mobility. In our data, explanatory variables may (and typically do) vary across the months of an individual's biography or an individual career spell. In the case of spell-fixed effects, explanatory variables that are constant throughout the career spell (such as job information) drop out. We compute standard errors clustered at the level of the individual throughout all our estimations. Figure 1 presents the unconditional hazard rates for the different exit routes separately for men and women for the case in which we measure career status by the number of subordinates. The graphs generally suggest lower career mobility for women than for men, especially with respect to upward and horizontal movements. Table 3 reports the determinants of the parenthood hazard as estimated in eq. (1) for the case in which we measure career status by the number of subordinates. 4 We find a nonlinear relationship between the parenthood hazard and age. For women, no births are reported in our data for individuals older than 45 years; thus we group the last two age categories in order to avoid perfect predictions. The results also suggest a concave experience pattern in the probability of parenthood as well as significant and strong effects of religion, the regional birth rate, being married and living in East Germany.
Empirical Results
Mixed Multivariate Proportional Hazard Model
While the effects on the timing of first birth are relatively similar in the male and female subsample, gender differences are more prevalent in the estimated coefficients of the career hazard equations. We find that many of the effects on the three transition directions are different between men and women, both in significance and in magnitude. Especially variables related to fertility turn out to interact with the career development in different ways. The results for the mixed multivariate proportional hazard model are shown in Table 4 . For our main variable of interest, the results suggest that the parenthood hazard is significantly negatively related to women's horizontal job mobility. Given the log-log specification, a 1% higher parenthood hazard is associated with a 0.18% lower hazard for horizontal career transitions. For upward transitions, we find a negative but statistically insignificant relationship. For downward transitions, the association is small and positive but also statistically insignificant. Note that the statistical insignificance of these effects might be due to the much smaller number of observations for these transitions (see Table 1 ). For men, the results suggest a significant positive association of the parenthood hazard with upward movements and insignificant effects for downward and horizontal movements. The results imply that for men, a 1% higher parenthood hazard translates into a 0.20% higher hazard for climbing up the career ladder. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that an increased likelihood of fatherhood is beneficial for job transitions to higher hierarchical levels. For women, the results suggest that horizontal (but not upward) mobility is hampered by a high probability of becoming a mother in the near future. Table 4 also shows other interesting effects. To identify the effect of cohabitation, we use individuals with no partner as the reference category compared to those with partners with high or low education. The education variable is supposed to capture differences in human capital (Verbakel and De Graaf 2008) . It turns out that cohabiting with a partner with low education decreases women's propensity to change to a job with a higher level of personnel responsibility, while it makes an upward transition for men more likely. For women, the same relationship is observed for horizontal transitions, but of a smaller magnitude. This asymmetry may reflect that men are often unwilling to be "overtaken" by their female partners. By contrast, cohabiting with a highly educated partner increases the likelihood of upward career transitions for men and women. These cases may reflect career competition within relationships or support through the high level of human capital of the partner. We find no age effects when it comes to upward or downward career movements after we control for the parenthood hazard. A stable result across all equations and both genders is the significant effect of the mobility indicator (i.e. number of residential changes in the last 24 months). This effect is likely to pick up the potential link between career changes and residential mobility.
The likelihood of making an upward, downward or horizontal transition strongly depends on the current position in the career hierarchy. We find strong effects of negative state dependence (LEVEL) for upward and horizontal transitions for both men and women. This mostly reflects the fact that, with increasing personnel responsibility, further improvements become harder because the number of vacancies at higher hierarchical levels is smaller. For men, we additionally find positive state dependence at higher ranks for downward transitions. As to the effect of duration dependence (CAR), we observe no strong duration dependence effects for upward or downward transitions for women, suggesting that no "career automatism" exists. If anything, we observe negative duration dependence for horizontal transitions. For men, the negative duration dependence can be observed for all transition types. This indicates that career mobility is stronger in the early phase of an employment spell, whereas individuals tend to become less mobile with rising tenure. We also consider effects of lagged duration dependence (LDsub, LDnosub). We do so separately for past spells with and without personnel responsibility. Having already worked in a job with subordinates is weakly positively related to the hazard of upward transitions for women. This suggests dynamic effects in career paths implying that earlier disadvantages (such as the negative parenthood effect for women's horizontal transitions) have additional long-term consequences. For men, we find a generally negative effect of past spell lengths with downward movements, irrespective of whether they were with or without subordinates.
As to the effect of educational qualifications on career transitions, our results suggest that the likelihood of making horizontal transitions increases with the degree of formal education for women. For men, we find that the likelihood of upward transitions rises with a higher educational level. For horizontal movements, we especially find a positive association with tertiary education. Our results for the self-reported indicators of maths skills and verbal abilities conform to prior expectations: individuals with higher ability are significantly more likely to climb up the career ladder, while we find no effects of our ability indicators on downward and horizon-tal transitions.
5 Interestingly, high verbal competence scores are much more important for upward transitions of women than for those of men. This directly corresponds to the well-known feature of Lazear and Rosen (1990) 's model that women have to pass a higher ability threshold than men in order to proceed to a higher career level. We observe a positive association of the number of past jobs with downward and horizontal job changes for men, suggesting a general pattern of mobility or immobility respectively. However, for women, the number of past jobs is negatively related to downward and horizontal job movements, which may be interpreted as a career pattern in which mobility tends to decrease over time. For both men and women, we do not estimate a separate effect of the number of past jobs on the likelihood of upward movements. This may be interpreted as evidence against the hypothesis that "job shopping" has positive effects on further career progression. The effects for the other covariates shown in Table 4 are mostly in line with expectations and are therefore not discussed here. Table 4 also shows our results for the two mass points of the unobserved heterogeneity term . 6 Our results suggest two types of women, one with 1 = ( , , ℎ ) = (−6.335, −6.978, −5.838) and one with 2 = (−4.990, −5.221, −4.817). The proportion of type 1 in the population of women is = 0.891, that of type 2 is (1 − ) = 0.109. Type 2 is uniformly more mobile than type 1. There are no differential effects of unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the different mobility directions. This is remarkable as, in principle, it would be possible that one of the types is more upward but less downward mobile than the other type. The pattern of unobserved heterogeneity is slightly different for men. Here, type 1 with 1 = (−4.785, −6.871, −4.843) is more mobile than type 2 with 2 = (−6.514, −9.139, −4.431) except for the slightly stronger tendency of not changing to lower personnel responsibility. Table 5 shows the mixed multivariate proportional hazard estimates for the specification with changes in the occupational rank described by the SIOPS. With very few exceptions, the results are remarkably consistent with the ones obtained in the model with the number of subordinates as the dependent variable. This is particularly true for the estimated association of the parenthood hazard with the likelihood for different career transitions. As in the specification with the number of subordinates, we find a statistically significant negative association of the likelihood of becoming a parent with horizontal job movements for women, and a significantly positive association with upward mobility for men. Note that the effects of the parenthood hazard on job transitions from this specification and from all other specifications estimated by us are reproduced in Table 6 . 
Fixed-Effects SUR Model
We now turn to the fixed-effects approach to estimating our system of hazard equations. The advantage of the fixed-effects model (7) to (10) is that the parenthood hazard (and all other explanatory variables) may be arbitrarily correlated with unobserved time-constant (or, alternatively, spell-constant) determinants of individual career transitions. In this way, we difference out unobserved person-specific characteristics such as timeconstant personal preferences or personal circumstances, which may also influence career transitions. Results for these estimations are given in Table 8 in the appendix.
The most important result in these estimations is that our main findings concerning the effect of the parenthood hazard on career transitions also survive in a fixed-effects setting. The estimates for women based on the number of subordinates suggest that the monthly probability of a horizontal job transition is significantly negatively related to the monthly probability of starting parenthood. More concretely, if the probability of becoming a mother is increased by one percentage point, the probability of a horizontal job transition is reduced by 0.24 percentage points. It is not significantly related to upward or downward transitions. For men, the parenthood hazard is significantly positively related to upward transitions but unrelated to downward or horizontal transitions. In particular, the probability of an upward transition is increased by about 0.08 percentage points if the parenthood hazard is raised by one percentage point. Note that many of the other estimated effects in Table 8 are relatively insignificant, which is a typical result for within-estimates of explanatory variables with limited temporal variation.
The results for the case in which we allow the fixed effects to vary over career spells are given in Table 9 in the appendix. The main effects are reproduced in Table 6 . In this specification, there may be person-specific effects that are constant within career spells, but different across career spells. Again, the results confirm our previous findings about the relationship between the parenthood hazard and career transitions. As before, a higher parenthood hazard for women is significantly related to lower horizontal career mobility. Moreover, the (smaller) negative relationship between the parenthood hazard and upward transitions, which appeared in a similar form in the mixed multivariate proportional hazard model and in the model with person-specific fixed effects, turns significant in the model with spell-specific fixed effects. For men, the results confirm the finding of the mixed multivariate proportional hazard model and the model with person-specific fixed effects that a higher parenthood hazard is positively associated with a higher likelihood of upward transitions. Table 6 also shows the fixed-effects results based on changes in the SIOPS as the dependent variable (the full results for these specifications are available upon request). Both in the person-fixed effects and in the spellfixed effects case, we obtain a negative association of the parenthood hazard with horizontal transitions for women which is of the same magnitude as in the specification with changes in the number of subordinates as the dependent variable. Moreover, in the SIOPS fixed-effects case, the (much smaller) negative effect of the parenthood hazard on women's upward transitions becomes statistically significant. For men, the fixed-effects results for the SIOPS case look more mixed and are less significant.
Taken together, the results in Table 6 suggest a robust and statistically significant negative relationship between the probability of parenthood and horizontal job changes for women. In some specifications, we also observe a smaller negative relationship between the likelihood of becoming a mother and upward mobility. For men, the results suggest a significant positive relationship between the parenthood hazard and upward mobility which is robust across almost all specifications.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper analyzes career progression patterns of childless men and women in Germany. The descriptive analysis of career transition hazards confirms previous findings in the literature that women generally exhibit lower career mobility than men. In order to investigate the determinants of individual career transitions in more detail, we estimated a mixed multivariate proportional hazard model with competing risks for upward, downward and horizontal job transitions while simultaneously modeling the hazard of first births and its effect on career transitions. As an alternative specification, we considered a fixed-effects approach. Our results suggest that a high contemporaneous probability of becoming a parent significantly lowers horizontal but not upward or downward career mobility for women. In some specifications, we also find a significant but smaller negative association with female upward career mobility. For men, we find that a higher contemporaneous probability of becoming a parent increases the likelihood of upward but not of downward or horizontal career transitions. These results persist if we allow for a correlation of parenthood hazards with unobserved individual characteristics such as time-or spell-constant personal preferences in a fixed-effects model.
We believe that our findings contribute to the literature on the relationship between fertility and career transition patterns. Given the information available in our data, we cannot take a stand on what the exact sources of the effects measured by us are. In principle, they are compatible with both employer discrimination and with voluntary behavior on the side of the individual. We emphasize that none of the individuals considered in our analysis already had children so that we can attribute all of the relationships measured by us to potential fertility. This means that in both cases, our results point to some form of forward-looking behavior. This may be forwardlooking behavior on the side of employers who avoid hiring women who are likely to become pregnant, but who like hiring men who look as if they are about to start a family soon. It may also be voluntary behavior on the side of individuals who deliberately do or do not take certain career steps in anticipation of expected family commitments. It may also be an interaction of both if individuals and employers anticipate each other's behavior in relation to expected fertility.
We can rule out that our results are driven by the long-term sorting of individuals into different career types with potentially different career progression opportunities as modeled in Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017) . First, our career progression equations control for a wide range of observable individual characteristics so that we only consider the career movements of individuals who are comparable in a wide range of aspects when they take a particular career decision. This includes, among many other things, the sector the person works in, information on previous career steps and ability indicators. The wide range of observables controlled for will also proxy to a certain extent for unobservables determining career transitions. Second, in our fixed-effects results, we explicitly control for unobserved person-specific preferences of career transitions which may be time-or spell-constant. These can be arbitrarily correlated with all the observables of our model. Importantly, they may also be arbitrarily correlated with unobserved fertility preferences of individuals. We observe within individuals' biographies and within their employment spells that changes in predicted fertility are associated with changes in the likelihood for different career transitions. This rules out that the patterns found by us are the result of prior sorting of individuals with particular long-term preferences for children into careers with certain career progression opportunities. We cannot rule out, however, that individuals sort into more family-friendly jobs once they plan to have children.
An important caveat of our results is that we only observe job-to-job transitions. As argued above, we expect both the potential effects of employer discrimination and those of voluntary supply-side behavior to be weaker for internal promotions for which employers have more information and employees do not necessarily need to write applications in order to move to new positions. Independent of the sources of the effects measured by us, we obtain the important result that there are marked gender differences in the relationship between potential fertility and individual career patterns. In the labor market studied by us, fertility influences career progression even before it happens, and it does so very differently for men and women. 
Notes
